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Major Issues
Colonial politicians who met at a Constitutional Convention in 1891 and again in 1897–
1898 created the Australian Federal Constitution. They agreed without argument that there
should be a bicameral Legislature consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives
but it took exhaustive debates extending over many days to determine the respective
powers of the two Houses and their relationships with each other.
The small Colonies, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania, (Queensland was
absent after 1891) fearing domination by Victoria and New South Wales, were determined
that the Senate should be seen as a House designed to protect the interests of the separate
Colonies. Accordingly, the States were to be accorded equal representatives in the Senate.
Today Tasmania has only five Members of the House of Representatives but it has
12 Senators.
Under the guidance of Sir Henry Parkes in 1891, all Colonies agreed that the Senate
should also be a House which would independently review Bills passed by the House of
Representatives. Eventually the Senate was given the power to reject any Bill transmitted
to it from the Lower House, even budget measures, which the Convention acknowledged
should originate in the House of Representatives where governments were formed.
The Senate's role as a House of Review was further strengthened by giving Senators six
year terms with half retiring every three years. Delegates from New South Wales and
Victoria, on becoming more aware of the scope of the concessions made to the other
Colonies, began to press for some means of resolving deadlocks between the two Houses.
The result was section 57. It provides that if the Senate twice rejects a Bill passed by the
House of Representatives the Governor-General may dissolve both Houses. If, after
general elections, the dispute continues the matter is to be resolved at a joint sitting of the
two Houses.
This paper examines the Convention dialogues and concludes that the agreed
constitutional fabric outlined above was fashioned in an era of political conservatism
which by 1900 was nearing its end. The Founders of the Constitution as a whole failed to
anticipate the growth of centralised major political parties, which would present a united
front and dominate debates in parliaments throughout Australia.
There have been six double dissolutions following unresolved disputes between the two
Houses of Parliament, five of them since 1950. None has involved a State issue nor been
the result of independent review. All six have occurred because the Government was
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outnumbered in the Senate by the parties in Opposition. In the most celebrated case in
1975 the Governor-General dismissed the Whitlam Labor Government because the Senate
would not pass two Appropriation Bills necessary for carrying on the ordinary annual
services of the Government. The action created an intense controversy across the country
which few would want to see repeated.
It is now a recurrent feature of the Australian Parliament that the government of the day
usually does not have a majority in the Senate and that it has to engage repeatedly in
negotiation with opposition parties or one or two independent Senators to modify Bills
rather than have them rejected outright. Such a state of affairs gives rise to the question
whether Senate power should be abridged in some way which recognises that proceedings
in the Upper House should not be dominated by repeated divisions along party lines.
Federalism involves compromise and provides a natural haven for the expression of
checks and balances appropriate to a society which has opted for a federal rather than a
unitary form of government. Thus conflicts between the Senate and House of
Representatives can be seen as reflecting the true spirit of federalism. Viewed in another
way, however, there is a contest between the cabinet system of responsible government
and the exercise of Senate constitutional power in the hands of political parties which have
failed to win government.
There have been two major constitutional reviews undertaken since 1950. The first was by
a joint all party Committee of the Australian Parliament, known as the Constitution
Review Committee, which reported in 1959. The other was the Constitution Commission
which completed its task in 1988. Both bodies were on common ground in pointing to the
potentially dangerous impact of the Senate flexing its muscle to reject Taxation Bills and
budgetary measures such as Appropriation Bills. As an alternative to a double dissolution,
the Committee advocated a joint sitting of the two Houses if the Senate had not passed
such a measure within 30 days. The Commission preferred that the Senate should only
have a suspensory veto but in the context of a four year Parliament instead of three as at
present, with a double dissolution being possible in the fourth year.
In the case of ordinary Bills not to do with finance, the Constitutional Commission's
approach stood in stark contrast to the Constitution Review Committee's recommendation
which was again to have a joint sitting as an option to a dissolution. The Commission
proposed to dispense with double dissolutions altogether in the first three years of a four
year Parliament. The view expressed in this paper is that this proposal would have an
inherent capacity to encourage a Senate majority in opposition to greater intransigence if
section 57 no longer exposed that House to the threat of dissolution.
At the end of this paper there are the writer's own suggestions for revision of section 57
which abandon all resort to a double dissolution because it disrupts responsible
government. Section 57 read together with the Senate's powers defined in section 53 in a
party dominated political system is, it is submitted, not consistent with the position the
Commonwealth now occupies in the Federation. It is the dominant entity not only fiscally
speaking but also because federal legislation permeates the daily lives of all members of
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the Australian society without regard to State boundaries. Federal voters see government
as being led by a Prime Minister who is a member of the House of Representatives with a
Ministry consisting mainly of members of that House. It is this elected body of
Parliamentarians that the electorate regards as being answerable to it.
Experience has shown that Australian voters are reluctant to approve changes to the
Constitution. If section 57 is to be changed it will need to enjoy the full support of strongly
led major parties in the Federal Parliament to have any hope of success.
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Introduction
The Australian Senate is the distinctive product of a nineteenth century grass roots federal
movement. Its powers are such that it can coerce even a recently elected government
commanding a solid majority in the House of Representatives into modifying the
legislative program it successfully espoused on the hustings. No other upper chamber in
parliamentary democracies of the Westminster type has greater powers. When the political
representatives of the youthful Australian Colonies decided to federate for reasons of
kinship, commerce and defence they had no intention of granting to the new
Commonwealth Parliament any greater legislative powers than were necessary, and none
that might threaten the integrity of the States as equal and separate components of the
federal system. They saw the Senate as paramountly the protector of their interests in the
forthcoming Federal Parliament, at the same time acting as an independent chamber of
review.
Sharing Legislative Power
Section 53 deals with the allocation of legislative power between the Senate and House of
Representatives. It recognises that proposed laws appropriating revenue or money or
imposing taxation, known as Money Bills, must originate in the House of Representatives
and it states that though the Senate may suggest amendments it may not amend proposed
laws imposing taxation or appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual
services of the government. But the section concludes by saying that, except as provided
in the section, the Senate should have equal power with the House of Representatives in
respect of all proposed laws.
It seems beyond argument that the last paragraph of the section accords to the Senate full
power to pass or reject any Bill, including a Money Bill, transmitted to it from the House
of Representatives. The Senate has always acted on that assumption without any formal
challenge from the House of Representatives and it is perfectly plain from the Convention
debates in the 1890s that this was the Founders' intention.1
Section 53 reads:
Proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys, or imposing taxation, shall not
originate in the Senate. But a proposed law shall not be taken to appropriate revenue or
moneys, or to impose taxation, by reason only of its containing provisions for the
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imposition or appropriation of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or
payment or appropriation of fees for licences, or fees for services under the proposed
law.
The Senate may not amend proposed laws imposing taxation, or proposed laws
appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the government.
The Senate may not amend any proposed law so as to increase any proposed charge or
burden on the people.
The Senate may at any stage return to the House of Representatives any proposed law
which the Senate may not amend, requesting, by message, the omission or amendment of
any items or provisions therein. And the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit,
make any of such omissions or amendments, with or without modifications.
Except as provided in this section, the Senate shall have equal power with the House of
Representatives in respect of all proposed laws.
Disagreements Between the Houses
During the Convention debates it took some time for participants to appreciate that the
power given to reject measures passed by the House of Representatives could give rise to
irreconcilable differences between the two Houses. In the upshot, section 57 was written
into the Constitution to provide a means of resolving deadlocks by resort to a simultaneous
dissolution of both Houses.
Section 57 is the third longest section in the Constitution. It was not made for easy
reading. In general terms it provides that if the Senate, with an interval of three months
intervening, twice rejects a proposed law or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments
to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve
both Houses simultaneously. If the disagreement persists after the election of a new
Parliament the Governor-General may convene a joint session of the two Houses to vote
on the proposed law. If it is passed by an absolute majority of the total number of
members of both Houses it becomes law after receiving the Royal assent.
Section 57 reads:
If the House of Representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails
to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not
agree, and if after an interval of three months the House of Representatives, in the same
or the next session, again passes the proposed law with or without any amendments
which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects or
fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will
not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of
Representatives simultaneously. But such dissolution shall not take place within six
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months before the date of the expiry of the House of Representatives by effluxion of
time.
If after such dissolution the House of Representatives again passes the proposed law,
with or without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the
Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which
the House of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may convene a joint
sitting of the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.
The members present at the joint sitting may deliberate and shall vote together upon the
proposed law as last proposed by the House of Representatives, and upon amendments,
if any, which have been made therein by one House and not agreed to by the other, and
any such amendments which are affirmed by an absolute majority of the total number of
the members of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be taken to have been
carried, and if the proposed law, with the amendments, if any, so carried is affirmed by
an absolute majority of the total number of the members of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it shall be taken to have been duly passed by both Houses of the
Parliament, and shall be presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent.2
There have been six double dissolutions under section 57 but Senate muscle has had a
much greater impact than the number suggests. This paper explores the factors which led
to eventual agreement during the Convention debates that deadlocks should be resolved
according to the processes of section 57 and assesses whether the section is apposite to a
federation now 100 years old.3 The starting point is the first National Australasian
Convention which met in Sydney in 1891.4
The Convention Debates—1891 and 1897–985
Sydney Constitutional Convention of 1891
In 1891, after a conference of colonial political leaders in Melbourne in 1890, all six
colonial legislatures sent seven representatives each, all politicians, to a Convention in
Sydney to see if they could conjure up agreement on a federal union. Astonishingly, under
the impressive leadership of Sir Henry Parkes and his deputy, Sir Samuel Griffith, the
Convention, working through committees, produced a draft Constitution after only seven
days' debate.6
The draft document provided for a Senate and a House of Representatives with the Senate
composed of eight Senators from each State to be chosen by their Parliaments. Money
Bills were a major topic of debate. Adamant that the Senate should be the protector of
their interests, delegates from the small Colonies, notably South Australia, urged upon the
Convention that the Senate and the House of Representatives should have equal legislative
power. After two days of intensive debate, however, they conceded that Money Bills
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should originate in the Lower House. In return, the Convention agreed upon a clause
expressly stating that the Senate was to have equal power with the House of
Representatives in respect of all proposed laws:
except for laws imposing taxation and laws appropriating the necessary supplies for the
ordinary annual services of the government, which the Senate may affirm or reject, but
may not amend.7
The clause became known as the compromise of 1891.
Shortly before the closure a Victorian delegate, Mr Wrixon, made the first suggestion for a
deadlock clause, oddly enough to deal with a situation in which the House of
Representatives would not accept a Senate suggestion to amend a Money Bill.8 His
proposal received short shrift, Sir Samuel Griffith, the Chairman of the Constitutional
Committee, saying that the suggestion was dangerous and that he had no love for artificial
means of settling differences between the two Houses.9
The Convention ended with a decision that each Colonial Legislature should submit the
draft Federal Constitution for the approval of the people of the Colony. Discontent
permeated subsequent discussions in the various Chambers, encouraged by misgivings
among communities which had little understanding of the issues at stake. By the end of
1892 no Legislature had taken the necessary action. News that the discussion had broken
down completely in the key Colony of New South Wales resulted in all Colonial
Legislatures failing to carry out the task allotted to them by the 1891 Convention.
Adelaide Convention of 1897
Over the next few years an economic depression swept across the Colonies highlighting
their weakness as separate entities. At the same time popular federal movements gained
strength and in 1895 a Premiers' Conference agreed to another convention to consist of ten
delegates from each Colony this time directly chosen by the electors and not the
Legislatures.10
Delegates from all Colonies except Queensland assembled at Adelaide in March 1897.
Edmund Barton, appointed leader of the Convention11, introduced discussion with a set of
federal resolutions not dissimilar to those propounded by Sir Henry Parkes in 1891.
However, unlike Parkes, Barton, quite specifically described the Senate as a States'
Assembly with representatives chosen in such a way as to secure to it 'a perpetual
existence, combined with definite responsibility to the people of the State which shall have
chosen them.'12
All but three of the colonial representatives were members or former members of their
Legislatures which meant that discussions about relationships between the two Houses
were certain to occupy much debating time. In fact, there was a concerted challenge to the
compromise of 1891, led by the South Australian contingent which gave rise to a two day
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debate described by Quick and Garran in their prestigious work on the Australian
Constitution as the most momentous in the Convention's whole history.13 The compromise
was preserved only by a margin of two votes—25 votes to 23.
By 1891 there had been several examples of disputes in the Legislatures of the Australian
Colonies. In Queensland in 1885–86 there was a dispute about whether the nominee
Legislative Council should be guided by the conventional rule against amending Money
Bills which the hereditary House of Lords accepted in Britain. There had been
controversies in Victoria over the Legislative Council's exercise of its legal power to reject
but not to alter Money Bills. In South Australia there were similar struggles. The
culmination was reached in 1881 when the South Australian Parliament passed an Act to
resolve legislative conflicts, by firstly, a dissolution of the House of Assembly to be
followed, if necessary, by a double dissolution or the election of additional members of the
Legislative Council.14
A few delegates said that some mechanism to settle disputes between the two Houses was
essential. Taking the initiative, Bernhard Wise of New South Wales moved for a clause to
provide in the event of a dispute over any Bill that in the first instance the House of
Representatives should be dissolved and secondly if, following the election the Senate
rejected the same Bill for a second time, the Senate should be dissolved.15 Then H. B.
Higgins of Victoria moved an amendment to provide for a simultaneous dissolution of
both Houses instead of consecutive dissolutions.16 Both proposals provoked hostility from
the small Colonies, and were not helped by Convention leader Barton, himself from New
South Wales, saying that past struggles in the Colonies had nearly always been over
attempts to conceal in Taxation Bills matters on other subjects. He saw no need for a
deadlock clause.17 Senior spokesman for South Australia, Sir John Downer, said that the
Senate's powers had already been weakened on financial matters and it was wrong for that
House representing the States as individual entities to be placed under pressure to submit
to the House of Representatives on pain of dissolution. Such a proposal was unsuited to a
federation.18 The two proposals were decisively beaten.19
Undeterred, Isaac Isaacs, in conjunction with Sir George Turner, both of Victoria, then
moved that in lieu of a dissolution of either House, the disputed law should be submitted
to a popular referendum of electors and, if approved by requisite majorities, it should be
submitted for the Royal assent. The proposal had the advantage from the small States'
point of view that it would leave the continuity of the Senate undisturbed. Nevertheless the
motion was defeated by 18 votes to 13. Isaacs then said 'We will carry it next time.'20 He
was wrong.
With its work on a new Convention completed, the Convention adjourned. Plainly, in a
discussion dominated by State rights and Money Bills, the majority were still to be
convinced that a deadlock clause was required. W. A. Trenwith of Victoria was one of the
few who visualised, at this stage, that deadlocks could arise on matters of policy
unconnected with finance as had happened in Victoria a few years before over a Factories
Act.21
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One decision at Adelaide was to have unforeseen consequences for the future Federal
Parliament and that was to substitute the direct election of Senators by the electors of a
State, voting as one electorate, for the election of Senators by the State Parliaments as
agreed in 1891.22 Only a handful of delegates at Adelaide had any real experience of party
politics and few were capable of predicting that voting patterns on party lines would
invade all Australian political systems soon after Federation as fledgling Labor parties
grew in strength.
Sydney Session in 1897
Four months elapsed before the Convention met again, for a second time, in Sydney. In
the meantime the Legislative Assemblies of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia
and Tasmania produced a variety of deadlock clauses, with some reluctance in the case of
the latter two Colonies. Thus the scene was set for a major debate. In fact, the debate
lasted six days and accounted for some 400 of the 1100 pages of the official record,
making deadlocks easily the most debated single subject in the entire series of Convention
debates.
Decision in Favour of a Deadlock Clause
Before the deadlock debate began, the Convention, after a long and torrid debate,
overwhelmingly rejected a New South Wales proposal to displace equal representation of
the States in the Senate in favour of proportional representation.23 John Symon of South
Australia likened the New South Wales action to the cassowary bird which:
On the plains of Timbuctoo,
Ate up the missionary,
Body, bones and hymn-book, too.
A contrary decision would have completely disaffected the small Colonies. A
consequence, however, was that more delegates were encouraged to think there should be
some limit placed on the Senate's veto. After two days the Convention inevitably decided
by 30 votes to 15 that there had to be a deadlock clause.24 Thereafter, however, there was a
strong cleavage of opinion as to its nature. Broadly speaking, delegates divided into two
camps—those favouring a popular referendum and others who thought that inter-House
disputes should be resolved by the dissolution process.
Popular Referendum
Debate commenced with a proposal by the New South Wales Legislative Assembly for a
popular or so-called mass referendum. If either House twice rejected a Bill passed by the
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other in two sessions of the same Parliament the Bill should be submitted to a national
referendum at which a simple majority vote would decide whether the measure should
become law.25 The proposal differed from the Isaacs-Turner proposal defeated at Adelaide
which, in addition to a national majority, required separate majorities in a majority of
States. Smaller Colony delegates saw the proposal as favouring the interests of the two
most populous Colonies at their expense. It attracted the vociferous opposition of South
Australian, John Symon, who countered with a proposal that in the event of a deadlock
there should first be a dissolution of the House of Representatives and, if the deadlock
persisted, a double dissolution should follow.26
Consecutive Dissolutions
In the face of opposition from delegates from New South Wales and Victoria, Symon
eventually amended his proposal by dispensing with the double dissolution and providing
instead for the Senate alone to be dissolved if the conflict continued after the House of
Representatives had been dissolved. However, in the eyes of delegates from the two large
Colonies a consecutive dissolution lacked finality and, furthermore, placed the Senate in a
redoubtable position by enabling it to witness without immediate risk to itself a dissolution
of the lower House and an ensuing election. Nevertheless the Symon proposal was carried
by 27 votes to 22.27 Since the operative effect was to displace the New South Wales
proposal for a popular referendum there were obviously rugged times ahead. The majority
vote included only four delegates from New South Wales and Victoria.
Double Dissolution Plus a National Referendum
Proponents of a popular referendum refused to lie down. William J. Lyne of New South
Wales moved for a national referendum if disagreement continued after a double
dissolution28, whilst Sir George Turner kept Victorian hopes alive by seeking to resurrect
the Isaacs-Turner proposal for a dual referendum previously defeated at Adelaide.29
Bernhard Wise of New South Wales attempted to straddle various camps by moving, by
way of amendment of the Turner motion, for the settlement of deadlocks in the first
instance by a double dissolution and if this failed to resolve the crisis by resort to a
national referendum.30
The Convention, to some extent entrapped by its own procedures, became engulfed in a
debate which ended rather surprisingly in the Wise amendment being carried by 25 votes
to 20.31 Thus an important decision had been made—if there were to be a referendum at all
it should only be after a dissolution whether simultaneous or consecutive.
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Referendums Defeated
In the following debate, the smaller Colonies rallied enough support to oust first the Lyne
proposal involving a mass referendum, and then the Turner proposal for settling deadlocks
by the sole means of a dual referendum.32 Taking advantage of the situation,
J. H. Carruthers of New South Wales moved for the omission of a national referendum
from the Wise proposal in favour of a joint sitting of the two Houses with a three–fifths
majority vote being required if the conflict continued after double dissolution. He was
successful.33 Yet as a final act the Convention kept on foot Symon's proposal for
consecutive dissolutions without a joint sitting to follow.
Melbourne Session in 1898
Opening a two day debate the leader of the Convention, Edmund Barton, moved at once to
strike out Symon's proposal for consecutive dissolutions but surprisingly he was easily
defeated.34 This prompted Symon in his turn to move for the removal of a simultaneous
dissolution of the two Houses from his amended proposal but this was also defeated.35 The
debate itself had become deadlocked and there were now murmurs of support for resolving
conflicts by a joint sitting of the two Houses without resorting to a double dissolution at
all.
Isaac Isaacs made a final plea for his much loved referendum. He said he knew of nothing
more useless than a joint sitting and yet the very fact that it was proposed showed that a
dissolution was an unsatisfactory way of dealing with inter-House conflicts. Accordingly,
the Convention should think again about his proposal for a referendum to meet the case in
which the parliamentary institution had broken down. Isaacs had Victorian and South
Australian support and even Carruthers supported him, but after a long debate, the
proposal was beaten by 30 votes to 15.36
With participants at the point of exhaustion, Symon acknowledged wider support for a
simultaneous dissolution and agreed to the withdrawal of a consecutive dissolution from
his proposal and this was done.37 However, it was not before the Convention had rejected
a proposal by Victorian H. B. Higgins to substitute a bare majority for the three-fifths
majority required at a joint sitting.38 And so there emerged from the Melbourne session a
clause very like section 57 except to require a three-fifths joint sitting majority. But New
South Wales was to have the last laugh. The Melbourne session ended with agreement on
a draft Constitution and cheers for the Queen and Australia.
Premiers' Conference in Melbourne in 1899
The draft Federal Constitution was submitted to popular vote in four Colonies but the total
affirmative vote in New South Wales at the referendum held on 3 June 1898 was less than
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required by the Australasian Federation Enabling Act 1898 of the Colony. Defeat made
federation impossible. A Premiers Conference convened in Melbourne at the request of
New South Wales considered several suggestions to make federation acceptable. One was
that the three–fifths majority at a joint sitting should be replaced by an absolute majority
of the total number of members of the two Houses. This was accepted and became the
final amendment to section 57.39
Deadlock Debate in Retrospect
Sections 53 and 57 emerged from the Conventions as hybrids—the result of a succession
of compromises in which responsible government on the British model, so well-known to
Australian colonial politicians, had to be reconciled with the particular interests of the
separate Colonies, as expressed by their representatives, if they were to become
components of a federation. The sections were fashioned in the background of a
conservative political environment which by 1900 was in decline, especially in New South
Wales where a militant Labor movement was well under way.
In 1891 Sir Henry Parkes saw Senators taking their places as independently minded
persons in a Senate primarily devoted to being a House of review. In 1897 Edmund
Barton, as leader of the Convention, impressed upon the new assembly of delegates the
role of the Senate as a States' Assembly and the entire deadlock debate bore the imprint of
his opening speech.
Among the few who prophesied that the Senate would not function effectively as a House
of the States was the prescient Alfred Deakin. Deakin said at Sydney in 1897:
... the contentions in the Senate or out of it, and especially any contention between the
two houses, will not and cannot arise upon questions in regard to which states will be
ranked against states. As was pointed out by the Hon. Member Mr. O'Connor in the
United States, and also in Switzerland, and in Canada, as here, the whole of the states
will be divided into two parties. Contests between the two houses will only arise when
one party is in possession of a majority in the one chamber, and the other in the
possession of a majority in the other chamber. We have had it submitted to us that
probably the Senate will be the more radical house of the two. I am willing to accept that
suggestion for the purposes of my argument, though the argument is equally good either
way. The House of Representatives would then be the more conservative body, and it is
possible that a more conservative party in the House of Representatives would be
confronted by a more radical party in the Senate. In both cases the result after a
dissolution would be the same. The men returned as radicals would vote as radicals; the
men returned as conservatives would vote as conservatives. The contest will not be,
never has been, and cannot be, between states and states ... it is certain that once this
constitution is framed, it will be followed by the creation of two great national parties.
Every state, every district, and every municipality, will sooner or later be divided on the
great ground of principle, when principles emerge.40
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The conclusion is inescapable that the Founders created a Senate to serve purposes which
would be either unattainable or would lose much of their significance in a nascent
Commonwealth. Nevertheless the Senate has always sustained itself as a formidable
component of the Australian bicameral Parliament. Various factors beyond the scope of
this paper will ensure that it remains so in the foreseeable future.41
The Double Dissolutions
In 1913 Bernhard Wise, who had been so prominent in the deadlock debate, echoed
Deakin's sentiments. At the same time he wondered what all the fuss over deadlocks had
been about. He wrote:
It is difficult for us, who have had twelve years' experience of the working of Federation,
to understand why so much stress was laid on these provisions for resolving deadlocks;
and why even those delegates who at Adelaide thought that conflicts between the two
Houses would be infrequent, and that, if they did occur, a deadlock might not be
disadvantageous, ultimately came round to the opinion that some provision, in the nature
of a safety-valve, would be desirable. The explanation is that the perception of the true
character of the Senate was obscured by the memories of traditional conflicts between
the two Chambers of the local Legislatures. The ghosts of dead controversies still walked
the political field; and 'Liberals' and 'Conservatives' alike discussed the functions of a
Federal Senate as though it were a local Upper House! Thus, the strange spectacle was
presented of 'Conservatives' demanding the fullest authority for a body elected by the
whole people of each State upon the widest possible franchise, and of 'Liberals' insisting
upon a limitation of its powers, in the name of democracy! Only one delegate ventured to
suggest that the question was of antiquarian rather than practical interest, and that any
disputes between the two Houses would be over measures of social reform, and not over
points of constitutional etiquette! Public opinion set steadily against this view; and the
Bill was opposed both in New South Wales and Victoria, because the provision requiring
a three-fifths majority at the Joint Sitting did not make the concession of equal
representation wholly illusory, but permitted the remote possibility that a majority of the
States might be able to protect themselves against coercion by the representatives of a
larger population … There never has been, nor, so far as we can see, will there ever be, a
division of opinion upon State lines; and the establishment of a Senate, in order to protect
State interests, appears now, as it appeared to Sir Henry Parkes, to have been an
unnecessary precaution.42
Contrary to Wise's expectations, a year later a deadlock occurred but, as he predicted, it
was not over the protection of State interests. Five double dissolutions have followed
since.43
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First Double Dissolution in 1914
In 1913 Liberals headed by Joseph Cook won office but with a majority of only one which
was lost after providing for a Speaker. Besides frustrations in the House of
Representatives, the Government faced a hostile Senate in which it held only seven of 36
seats. In 1914 after suffering reverses in both Houses, a weary Cook despatched a Bill to
the Senate abolishing preference to unionists in Commonwealth public employment which
the Senate twice rejected. The Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, granted a
double dissolution a few days before the Great War broke out. The Government was
decisively beaten at the general elections by Labor which won a majority in both Houses.
Thus the deadlock was resolved by the defeat of the proponent Government, but at least
the incoming Government enjoyed the stability which Prime Minister Cook had sought.
The dissolution did not occur for any of the reasons adumbrated by the majority of the
Founders during the Convention debates.
Second Double Dissolution in 1951
Between 1914 and 1950 governments for most of the time had working majorities in both
Houses. Even so, the Scullin Labor Government, which took office in 1929, faced an
adverse Senate during the whole of its term. In these times of national economic
depression, the Government suffered frequent defeats of its measures in the Upper House
without any thought of risking a double dissolution.
In 1949 a Liberal-Country Party coalition won a substantial majority in the House of
Representatives and most Senate vacancies but, because of Labor success at an earlier half
Senate election and a change in the method of electing senators, it held only 26 of 60
Senate seats. Prime Minister Robert Menzies was soon in trouble and, declining to put up
with the impasse, he presented a Bill to the Senate to re-establish the Commonwealth
Bank Board. This was a touchy subject because the previous Chifley Labor Government
had, for technical legal reasons, failed in its attempts to nationalise the banks. The Senate
twice failed to pass the Bill and the Prime Minister sought and obtained a double
dissolution. The Bill itself was merely the catalyst by which the Government hoped to
increase its numbers in the Senate. In the event, it was returned with a majority in both
Houses which made a joint sitting unnecessary. The Senate passed an equivalent Bill.
Third Double Dissolution in 1974
Until the end of 1973, the Senate passed all the Government's annual Appropriation and
Supply Bills, even though in 19 of the 72 years of Parliament the Government did not have
a majority in the Senate.44
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In 1973–74 Mr Whitlam's Labor Government's legislative policy program suffered
disruption by the Senate twice rejecting six Bills transmitted to it from the House of
Representatives. In April 1974 the Leader of the Opposition announced in the House of
Representatives that his party intended to oppose the Government's Appropriation Bills in
both Houses and force the Government to an election. The Prime Minister replied that if
the Senate rejected any Money Bill he would advise the Governor-General to dissolve
both Houses.
Following an indication by the non-Government parties in the Senate that they would
defer consideration of the Money Bills until the Government agreed to an election for the
House of Representatives, the Prime Minister advised the Governor-General to dissolve
both Houses on the ground that the six other Bills satisfied the requisite conditions for a
double dissolution. The Senate then avoided a financial crisis by passing the Appropriation
Bills and the Governor-General granted the dissolution on 11 April.
Although the Government was returned to office it failed to win a majority in the Senate.
The six Bills were passed at the first and only joint sitting convened under section 57.45
Party alignments in the Senate brought about the entire situation and were to do so again
in the following year.
Legal Issues Arising from the Third Dissolution
The occasion did not pass without some litigation. Shortly before the joint sitting, two
opposition Senators challenged the validity of the double dissolution in the High Court in
the case of Cormack v Cope.46 The main argument was that a dissolution could only be
granted in respect of one Bill and not a cluster of Bills. Certainly the Founders discussed
section 57 in terms of a single Bill and moreover the section uses the words 'any proposed
law'. However, the court held that the section had a distributive operation and a dissolution
could apply to any number of proposed laws which met its requirements.47 This means that
a Government defeated in the Senate may accumulate a storehouse of Bills and choose
when it should bring about a double dissolution.
Further questions arose but were not settled in Cormack v Cope, including the extent to
which the section was justiciable in the Courts, given that it referred not to a law but to a
proposed law, and that the courts had not intervened in Parliament's law making
procedures.
Shortly afterwards there were two other cases. In Victoria v Commonwealth,48 four States
challenged the validity of the Petroleum and Minerals Exploration Act, one of the Bills
passed at the joint sitting on the ground that the requisite three months had not passed
between the first and second occasions on which the Bill had met its fate in the Senate.
The plaintiffs succeeded.
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In Western Australia v Commonwealth (the Territory Senators' case),49 two States
challenged three other Acts passed at the joint sitting, one of the grounds being the length
of time which had elapsed before the double dissolution had occurred after their rejection.
The court held that section 57 did not require that a double dissolution occur without
undue delay.
In 1988 a Constitutional Commission appointed by the Government in 1985 to review the
Constitution reported that as a result of the three cases the following points were settled:
(a) The provisions of section 57 are justiciable in relation to whether an occasion has
arisen on which a joint sitting is valid. In the PMA Case the High Court ruled that one of
the six Bills passed at the joint sitting, the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill 1973, was
invalid on the basis that the requisite three months had not passed between the Senate's
failure to pass the Bill and its second passage by the House of Representatives. The
majority judges indicated, however, that they did not regard the dissolution of the
Parliament as justiciable. In their view, if the double dissolution had been granted on the
basis of the Petroleum and Mineral Authorities Bill only and thus unauthorised by section
57, the ensuing elections would ensure that the new Parliament would be legitimate. This
means that the legitimacy of the Parliament elected following a double dissolution under
section 57 cannot be challenged, but a law enacted by a joint sitting of that Parliament may
be ruled invalid on the basis of events preceding the double dissolution.
(b) The section operates distributively, so that a double dissolution may be granted or a
joint sitting convened in relation to more than one Bill. This means that a Government can
build up a 'stockpile' of Bills on which to base a double dissolution and, potentially, have
them all passed at a joint sitting. It is an open question whether a declaration as to the
invalidity of the dissolution could be obtained before a proclamation dissolving both
Houses.
(c) There is no time limit within which a double dissolution must occur following the
second rejection of a bill by the Senate (provided that, as specified by the section, it does
not take place within six months before the expiry of the House of Representatives).
(d) The three months interval which must elapse before the second passage of the Bill by
the House of Representatives runs from the Senate's rejection of, or failure to pass, the Bill.
The expression 'fails to pass' involves the notion that a time has arrived when, allowing for
a reasonable period for deliberation, the Senate ought to decide whether or not to pass the
Bill or make amendments to it for the consideration of the House of Representatives.50
To the foregoing may be added that it seems clear that the Courts would almost certainly
treat the Senate as having the power to reject Appropriation Bills and Money Bills if the
question were to arise directly in connection with section 57. Neither is it necessary in
order to establish a deadlock that the inter-house conflict should be over a measure of vital
importance to the Government or bring the work of Parliament to a standstill. As the cases
show, however, several questions about the interpretation and application of the section
still arise.51
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Fourth Double Dissolution in 1975
There was an extraordinary application of section 57 in 1975, the occasion of the most
momentous of all six double dissolutions. The Whitlam Government faced a Senate
seemingly as hostile as in the year before. Proposed laws covering many subjects
continued to be twice rejected. Meanwhile it seemed to the opposition parties that some
Government financial policies and ministerial actions were causing serious misgivings in
sections of the community and the media, leading to a decline in the Government's hard
won popularity in 1974.
On 11 October the opposition parties announced that their Senators would again vote
against two Appropriation Bills which were measures essential for the funding of the
ordinary annual services of the Government. The Opposition asserted that there was no
convention or understanding that the Senate should not exercise its constitutional power to
reject Money Bills and it proceeded to have the two Bills deferred in the Senate. On
23 October two further Appropriation Bills were deferred and the Government had a
financial crisis on its doorstep but the Prime Minister was unwilling to advise a double
dissolution.
In an unprecedented action in Australian federal history, on 11 November, the Governor-
General, Sir John Kerr, invoked the so-called reserve powers of the Crown and his
constitutional responsibilities and dismissed the Government. At the same time he
commissioned the Leader of the Opposition, Malcolm Fraser, to be Prime Minister on the
understanding that he would secure the passage of the two Bills in the Senate and advise a
double dissolution.
The financial crisis was resolved when the Senate passed the two Bills whereupon Prime
Minister Fraser advised a double dissolution. He could only do so, however, by invoking
the fact that the Senate had twice rejected the 21 Bills which the Whitlam Government had
transmitted to it. It would have been beyond the wildest dreams of the framers of the
Constitution that any government could invoke a double dissolution by relying on
proposed laws which its members had deliberately prevented from becoming laws when in
opposition.
The Fraser Government won a majority of seats in both Houses at the elections and section
57 had thus achieved the purpose of restoring stability to government. On the face of it, of
course, the section had been invoked simply as a means of the Opposition gaining
government.
Fifth Double Dissolution in 1983
In October 1980 the Fraser Government was returned to office but it lacked a majority in
the Senate. Between September 1981 and March 1983 the Senate twice rejected or failed
to pass 13 Bills transmitted to it, including nine Sales Tax Bills. At the time a struggling
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Australian economy and a prolonged drought were affecting the Government's popularity
but the Prime Minister sought and obtained a double dissolution.
As this event was occurring there was a sudden and dramatic change in the leadership of
the Labor Party. The Government was defeated at the elections and Labor took office
under Prime Minister Robert Hawke. In hindsight, the fifth double dissolution was an
occasion in which sound political judgement deserted the outgoing Government.
Role of the Governor-General
It was established practice before 1983 for a Prime Minister to inform the Governor-
General of the circumstances leading him to advise a double dissolution. There is no
public record of a Governor-General resisting the advice given him.
In 1983, in responding to the Prime Minister's request, the Governor-General, Sir Ninian
Stephen, wrote to him saying:
Such precedents as exist, together with the writings on section 53 of the Constitution,
suggest that in circumstances such as the present, I should in considering your advice,
pay regard to the importance of the measures in question and to the workability of
Parliament.52
After noting that the 13 proposed laws had been rejected or not passed for a considerable
time and referring to further information he had sought from the Prime Minister the
Governor-General granted the dissolution.
There is a question as to how far the Governor-General can or should go in satisfying
himself that the requirements of section 57 have been satisfied before dissolving the two
Houses. Legal issues may be involved, for example, as to when the Senate fails to pass a
Bill. The Governor-General would, however, be entitled to rely on the advice given by the
Prime Minister.
There is also a question whether the Governor-General may ultimately refuse a request for
a double dissolution once the requirements of section 57 have been fulfilled, the answer to
which is probably 'No'. Otherwise, the exercise of reserve powers aside, the Governor-
General would be in breach of the well established convention that the powers of the
Governor-General should be exercised in accordance with ministerial advice. Nevertheless
the precise role of the Governor-General under the section remains unsettled and
controversial.53
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Sixth Double Dissolution in 1987
In 1987 the Senate rejected for the second time the Australia Card Bill presented to it by
the Hawke Government. The Bill sought to institute a system of personal identification
mainly in an effort to combat tax evasion.
Seeking a double dissolution the Prime Minister informed the Governor-General, Sir
Ninian Stephen, that the Bill was a critical measure in its economic impact and the
principle of equity. The dissolution was granted and the Government was returned with a
substantial majority but remained in a minority in the Senate.
Belatedly, the Government became aware that to bring the Bill into operation required the
making of regulations which the Senate could and would disallow.54 The popular vote at
the elections failed to persuade the Senate to change its attitude to the Bill and the
Government neither sought a joint sitting nor persevered with the conflict by re-
introducing an amended version of it. The Government carried on without the Australia
Card, much to the relief of many members of the community. Apart from allowing the
Government to increase its lower House majority, the employment of section 57 was a
wasteful exercise.
A Seventh Double Dissolution?
The six double dissolutions show that a formal mechanism was necessary to resolve inter-
House conflicts and that section 57 has provided it in the sense of overcoming the
immediate cause of deadlock. However, the third and sixth dissolutions failed to overcome
the root cause of conflict, namely the lack of a government majority in the Senate.
In all elections after dissolution the rejected legislation was of little consequence as the
political parties competed with each other on the hustings. In the fourth dissolution the
rejected Bills were completely irrelevant.
In fact the six double dissolutions have confirmed Alfred Deakin's prophecy of 1897. State
interests, which dominated the Convention debates, have not surfaced, and will not.
Deadlocks occur simply through shows of strength by rival political parties in the Senate
with combined numbers greater than the Government.
From the point of view of the Government with its majority in the House of
Representatives, the idea of a double dissolution may constitute a greater deterrent than for
Opposition parties since a dissolution may afford the Opposition an opportunity to win
government, as happened in 1914 and 1983.
Since it first came to office in 1996 the Howard Liberal-National Party Government has
frequently negotiated with its Senate opponents to keep its legislative policies afloat and
though a double dissolution has been there for the asking, none has occurred. The Senate
may reject but not amend a proposed law imposing taxation. In 1999, the Government
Resolving Deadlocks in the Australian Parliament
17
introduced legislation for a goods and services tax as an essential component of major
taxation reform. The Goods and Services Tax Act which the Senate eventually passed was
of much modified scope to meet the demands of Australian Democrats Senators. This was
the only way, short of a double dissolution, in which the Government could implement its
new taxation system.
Clearly it is a matter of political judgement by the Prime Minister when to advise a double
dissolution but as section 57 has been interpreted, it allows a government that freedom of
action. Equally, the Opposition must exercise political judgement in deciding how far it
can go without precipitating a double dissolution or when to go the whole distance. This
state of affairs will continue because the system of proportional representation adopted for
the election of senators in 1948 will ordinarily result in a closely divided Senate.55
Proposals for Constitutional Change
Senate Select Committee in 1950
In 1950 a Senate Select Committee, in the absence of any government representation,
recommended that if the Senate did not pass an ordinary Bill within six months of
receiving it or, in the case of a Money Bill, two months, the dispute should be referred to a
joint sitting of the two Houses at which the will of an absolute majority should prevail.
Double dissolutions were to be abolished.56 The proposals greatly reduced Senate power
and influence and, not unexpectedly, the Menzies Government would have none of it.
Report of the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review in 1959
An all party Committee consisting of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, known as the Constitution Review Committee, first established in 1956
undertook an extensive review of the Constitution between 1957 and 1959. Its report in
1959 included proposals extensively amending section 57.57 The Committee concluded
that the Senate had not functioned as a House of the States or a Chamber of Review, as the
Founders intended58, and that section 57 needed to be modified in the interests of
maintaining the principle of continuous responsible government.59
When a Deadlock Occurs
The Committee's first concern was to modify the conditions necessary to create a
deadlock. For the purpose, it separated Money Bills, that is to say Bills imposing taxation
or appropriating revenue for the ordinary annual services of the government, from other
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Bills. As to the former, a deadlock was deemed to arise if the Senate had not passed the
measure within 30 days of receiving it. Other Bills had to be twice rejected by the Senate
but, if it did not pass the measure within 90 days and the House of Representatives again
submitted the Bill and the Senate did not pass it within 30 days, a deadlock was deemed to
arise.
Joint Sittings as an Alternative to Dissolution
In the event of a deadlock occurring in respect of any Bill, the Committee recommended
that it should be open to the Government to advise the Governor-General to convene a
joint sitting of the two Houses as an alternative course of action to a double dissolution. If
the joint sitting failed to resolve the dispute it was to remain open to the Government to
proceed to a double dissolution. However, if the proposed law causing the deadlock was
affirmed by an absolute majority of the total membership of the two Houses and, in
addition, by at least half the Members and Senators of a State in at least half the States, it
should be presented for the Queen's assent.
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie
The Constitution Review Committee's recommendations were well supported by both
Government and Labor members of the Committee and there was some optimism that its
work would receive serious attention in the party rooms and the Parliament. However
enthusiasm evaporated as the Government, influenced by its new Attorney-General,
Garfield Barwick, did not take any positive steps to bring the Committee's work before
Parliament. When the Committee was first formed, political gossip was that Mr Menzies'
main concern was to find a means of resolving deadlocks without necessarily incurring the
disruption which attended a double dissolution. In 1964 the Leader of the Opposition in
the Senate, Senator McKenna introduced a Bill to give effect to the Committee's proposals
and a debate occurred but no vote was taken.
If the Constitution Review Committee's proposal about Money Bills had become part of
Australian constitutional law the divisive events of 1975 would not have happened. The
amendment would also have alleviated disquiet arising from the 1975 experience about the
exercise of reserve powers of the Crown in the hands of a president of an Australian
Republic. The question came to the fore during the campaign for a republic in 1999. With
the Committee's proposal in place, the president of an Australian republic would not be
called upon to exercise a reserve power to dismiss a Prime Minister and his Government in
order to overcome a financial crisis such as occurred in 1975.
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Australian Constitutional Convention 1973–1985
On the initiative of Victoria, all States and the Commonwealth agreed to have a
Convention to examine the working of the Commonwealth Constitution. The idea
stemmed from the States’ dissatisfaction about their financial position and the need to
make annual pilgrimages to Canberra to obtain necessary funding. The Convention first
met in Sydney in 1973. Membership consisted of Commonwealth and State politicians
from the major parties plus Local Government representation. The Convention met in
different capital cities on six occasions between 1973 and 1985 in the course of which a
Standing Committee set up in 1973 turned its attention to sections 53 and 57.
At Hobart in 1976 Mr Gough Whitlam moved that the Senate's power under section 53 to
amend Money Bills or Bills imposing taxation should be removed. Sir Charles Court, the
Premier of Western Australia moved, in effect, a counter proposal that if the Senate had
not within 30 days passed a Bill appropriating money for the ordinary annual services of
the Government, there should be a double dissolution. If, after the elections, the
Representatives again passed the Bill, it should receive the Royal assent. Both proposals
were referred to the Standing Committee. In the upshot, the Convention at a session in
Adelaide in 1983 endorsed a Bill which the Standing Committee had prepared and was
based on the Court proposal.60
In 1983 and again in 1984 Senator Rae introduced a Bill to give effect to the Convention's
suggestion but the Government opposed it. The Bill failed to proceed to a second reading.
By 1985 the Convention's fortunes had declined, in large part from lack of Commonwealth
commitment, and it is yet to be resurrected.61
Constitutional Commission in 1988
In 1985 the Labor Government appointed a six person independent Constitutional
Commission to review the Constitution comprehensively.62 It too tackled the deadlock
question as well as Senate power under section 53. It reported in 1988, ninety years after
the conclusion of the Convention debates.63
Ordinary Bills
As to ordinary Bills, at first the Commission had in mind to discard double dissolutions
altogether. Instead, the Government should be able to proceed to a joint sitting if a
deadlock occurred. The idea was completely consistent with the Commission's belief that
section 57 had been used to bring about a double dissolution rather than to resolve a
deadlock over proposed legislation and that section 57 was detrimental to stable
government. Subsequently, the Commission changed its mind. It decided that the House of
Representatives should have a minimum term of three years and a maximum term of four
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years and that elections for members of the House and Senators should be simultaneous. It
then recommended that in the first three years there should be no formal provision at all
for resolving disputes between the two Houses but that the two Houses should be left to
sort out their own problems. In the fourth year a double dissolution could occur.64
As things are, it is more likely than not that a newly elected government will lack a Senate
majority. To face a Senate secure for three years from the threat of dissolution could be a
daunting prospect and become a potential formula for weak government.
Money Bills
As to Bills which the Senate may not amend, that is Appropriation Bills and the like, the
Commission observed:
It is now widely recognised that the provisions of the Constitution concerning the
Senate's powers over Money Bills are not satisfactory and should be altered. Precisely
how they should be altered the political parties have yet to agree upon.
The essential issue, it seems to us, is how long a Government which has the confidence
of the House of Representatives should be entitled to govern and who is to decide when
it is to face an election?  Is the Government to be held responsible to both Houses so that
if the Senate chooses to deny the Government the financial authority required to enable
the functions of government to be carried out, the Government must resign or risk
dismissal and the House of Representatives dissolved? In our view the primary principle
to which the Constitution should give expression is that Governments are formed,
effectively, by the House of Representatives and are entitled to govern so long as they
have the confidence of that House.65
The Commission recommended that in the first three years of a four year Parliament the
Senate should only have a suspensory veto over Bills providing for the imposition,
assessment or collection of taxation as well as for Bills appropriating money for the
ordinary annual services of the government, capital works, and the acquisition of land or
equipment. If the Senate should reject such a Bill or fail to pass it within 30 days of its
transmission the Bill should be presented for Royal assent.66 In the fourth year of
Parliament, however, the Commission proposed that any dispute should be dealt with by
resort to a double dissolution according to the formula it proposed for ordinary Bills. Like
its predecessor, the Constitution Review Committee, the Commission's report lies quietly
on the shelves as the country retreats from the failure in 1999 of the referendum to
establish an Australian Republic.
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The Future
The Senate as a House of Review
Speaking to his introductory Federal Resolutions in 1891, Sir Henry Parkes said of the
proposed Senate:
What I mean is an upper chamber, call it what you may, which shall have within itself
the only conservatism possible in a democracy—the conservatism of maturity of
judgement, of distinction of service, of length of experience, and weight of character—
which are the only qualities we can expect to collect and bring into one body in a
community young and experienced as Australia is.67
The function of review is the core feature of an upper House in a bicameral Parliament and
the Senate may undertake a review of the kind Parkes envisaged when it refers a House of
Representatives Bill to one of its Standing Committees or a Select Committee as is often
the case.68
In an era when there is an inevitability about the outcome of Parliamentary debates in the
House of Representatives in respect of Bills introduced by the Government of the day, the
work of the various Senate Committees has ensured an active role for the Senate as the
senior component of the Parliament. Ultimately, however, the fate or form of a contentious
Bill will usually be determined by the respective voting strengths of the parties on the
floor of the House, which is not what Parkes envisaged.
Money Bills
The Commonwealth and the States were intended to be equal partners under the federal
compact and the likely cost of the Commonwealth was not a serious debating point.
Indeed Sir Samuel Griffith, vice president of the 1891 Convention, speculated that the
annual cost of the Commonwealth would be less than the price of a dog licence per head
of population.
The 20th century has been a different story. In 1995–96 Commonwealth revenue from
taxation was $117 000 million compared with $30 000 million raised by all State and
Territory Governments. In the same year, total Commonwealth general government
expenditure was $127 000 million including $35 000 million transferred to the States
mainly under income tax sharing arrangements. State and Territory general expenditure
totalled $64 000 million.69 The figures demonstrate not only Commonwealth fiscal
ascendancy but also the need for any federal government enjoying the confidence of the
Representatives to have control of its annual budget.
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Section 57 is not suited to dealing with a major financial crisis. It takes some five months
from the Senate first rejecting a Bill to the time when the issue can be resolved, if at all, by
the next Parliament after a double dissolution.70
Unless there is change in the method of electing senators, a Senate closely divided
politically will continue to be a feature of the Australian Parliament contrary to the
expectations of its creators. Taking into account the extent of the Commonwealth's fiscal
responsibilities, the Senate should not exercise the power to reject Bills it may not amend
nor can the Australian community afford a repeat of the financial crisis which occurred in
1975.
The submission in this Paper is that in the case of Money Bills the restriction of the
Senate's power of veto to a suspensory veto lasting 30 days would be overwhelmingly in
the interest of responsible and stable government. The suspensory veto would extend to
Bills appropriating money for the ordinary annual services of the Government, including
capital items, and Bills providing for the imposition, assessment and collection of a tax.
Other Bills
A double dissolution is a disruptive event and occurs as a result of a breakdown in the
Parliamentary process. In 1959 the Constitutional Review Committee recommended a
joint sitting of the Houses as an alternative to a double dissolution. As the years pass it is
not unlikely that the community will become disenchanted by incessant party struggles in
the Senate and political negotiations conducted outside the Chamber which do little to
promote the prestige of the Parliament.
Section 57 could be amended in a manner which would give the Senate a sufficient
opportunity, perhaps in the order of 90 sitting days, to consider a Bill when first sent to it.
In the event of the Bill being rejected for a second time, the Governor-General in Council
should be able to convene a joint sitting. If an absolute majority of Senators and Members
and separate majorities in half the States affirm the Bill it should then be presented for the
Royal assent. The separate State majorities would compensate the Senate for its inferior
numerical strength in the joint sitting.
The Clerk of the Senate and an ardent exponent of its welfare, Harry Evans, complained in
the authoritative work, Odgers' Australian Senate Practice, that the High Court's expanded
interpretation of section 5771 coupled with its misuse by Prime Ministers over the years
had given the Government a de facto power of dissolution over the Senate which it was
not intended to have. The result was to greatly increase the possibility of Executive
domination of the Senate as well as the House of Representatives. A joint sitting in lieu of
a dissolution would dispose of the complaint.72 It would also put to one side many of the
uncertainties of meaning and operation associated with the present text of section 57.
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The Price of Federalism
Federalism connotes a contract between the parties to it. It denotes legalism, conservatism
and weaker government than in a unitary system. It provides a natural haven for the
expression of checks and balances against excesses of legislative and executive power in a
society which has set its mind against a unitary form of government. Viewed in this light,
conflicts between the Senate and the House of Representatives, whatever their cause or the
intention of the Founders, may be seen as reflecting the true spirit of federalism and worth
the cost. Thus things may be left as they are now.
Institutions of British origin sometimes do not perform efficiently but they usually have an
enduring quality about them and this can be said about the Australian Parliament. The
major political parties, generally speaking, see parliamentary executive government as a
continuous process and the present combination of federalism and responsible government
has worked for a century. In the bicameral system the function of review belonging to the
Senate is not necessarily to be discounted simply because voting on a bill coming from the
House of Representatives is on party lines.73 In the long run, however, the question is the
extent to which responsible government in the hands of a parliamentary executive should
be subjected to veto by the exercise of Senate legal power residing in the hands of parties
whose policies have failed to win government. There are no longer other national
parliamentary democracies of the Westminster type where popularly elected governments
have to face an upper house with powers matching those of the Senate under section 53 of
the Constitution.
This writer submits that the suggested changes to section 57 recognise the much expanded
and still expanding role of national government since Federation requiring legislative
support, at the same time leaving the basic constitutional bicameral fabric intact.
Constitutional Change
Referendums to change the Constitution usually fail.74 Irrespective of their merits they
have invariably failed when not supported by the major parties in the Australian
Parliament. Any proposed change perceived to weaken Senate power and influence is
bound to create controversy in Canberra. Beyond Canberra, in the States, such an occasion
would give rise to impassioned pleas about the true nature of the federal compact and the
threat which Canberra offers to it. Heirs to the Founders will have to be found if a change
is to be effected during the second century of Australian Federalism.
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Appendix 1: Simultaneous Dissolution Proclamations
Both Houses of the Australian Parliament have been dissolved simultaneously on the following
occasions:
1. On 30.7.1914, by the Rt Hon. Sir Ronald Craufurd Munro-Ferguson, when both Houses of
the Fifth Parliament were dissolved prior to the general elections of 5.9.1914.
PROCLAMATION
Commonwealth of By His Excellency the Right Honorable Sir Ronald Craufurd Munro
Australia to wit. Ferguson, a Member of His Majesty's Most Honorable Privy
R. M. Ferguson, Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order
Governor-General of Saint Michael and Saint George, Governor-General and Commander-in-
Chief in and over the Commonwealth of Australia.
WHEREAS by Section 57 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia it is provided that if
the House of Representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or
passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval
of three months the House of Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the
proposed law with or without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the
Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of
Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of
Representatives simultaneously:
And whereas on the eighteenth day of November One thousand nine hundred and thirteen the
House of Representatives passed a Bill for an Act to prohibit, in relation to Commonwealth
employment, preferences and discriminations on account of membership or non-membership of an
association, and the Senate on the eleventh day of December One thousand nine hundred and thirteen
rejected the said Bill.
And whereas on the twenty-eighth day of May One thousand nine hundred and fourteen the
House of Representatives in the next session again passed the said Bill, and the Senate on the twenty-
eighth day of May One thousand nine hundred and fourteen rejected the said Bill:
And whereas it is expedient to dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives
simultaneously:
Now therefore I, the Governor-General aforesaid, do by this my Proclamation dissolve the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
Given under my hand and the Seal of the Commonwealth of Australia this thirtieth day of July
in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and fourteen, and in the fifth year of His Majesty's
reign.
By His Excellency's Command
(L.S.) JOSEPH COOK
GOD SAVE THE KING!
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2. On 19.3.1951, by the Rt Hon. Sir William John McKell, when both Houses of the
Nineteenth Parliament were dissolved prior to the general elections of 28.4.1951.
PROCLAMATION
Commonwealth of By His Excellency the Governor-General in and over the Commonwealth
Australia to wit. of Australia.
W. J. McKELL
Governor-General.
WHEREAS by section fifty-seven of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia is provided
that if the House of Representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it,
or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an
interval of three months the House of Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the
proposed law with or without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the
Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it or passes it with amendments to which the House of
Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of
Representatives simultaneously:
And whereas on the fourth day of May, One thousand nine hundred and fifty, the House of
Representatives passed a proposed law, namely, a bill for an Act to repeal the Banking Act 1947-48 and
to amend the Commonwealth Bank Act 1945-1948.
And whereas on the twenty-first day of June, One thousand nine hundred and fifty, the Senate
passed the proposed law with amendments:
And whereas on the twenty-second day of June, One thousand nine hundred and fifty, the
House of Representatives disagreed to the amendments:
And whereas on the eleventh day of October, One thousand nine hundred and fifty, the House
of Representatives, in the same session, again passed the proposed law:
And whereas the Senate has failed to pass the proposed law:
Now, therefore, I, the Governor-General aforesaid, do by this my Proclamation dissolve the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
Given under my hand and the Seal of the Commonwealth this nineteenth day of March, in the
year of our Lord, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-one, and in the fifteenth year of His Majesty's
reign.
(L.S.) By His Excellency's Command.
ROBERT G. MENZIES.
Prime Minister.
GOD SAVE THE KING!
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3. On 11.4.1974, by the Rt Hon. Sir Paul Meernaa Caedwalla Hasluck, when both Houses of
the Twenty-eighth Parliament were dissolved prior to the general elections of 18.5.1974.
PROCLAMATION
Australia By His Excellency
PAUL HASLUCK the Governor-General of Australia
Governor-General
WHEREAS by section 57 of the Constitution it is provided that if the House of Representatives
passes any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to
which the House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the
House of Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the proposed law with or
without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate and the
Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of
Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of
Representatives simultaneously:
AND WHEREAS the conditions upon which the Governor-General is empowered by that
section of the Constitution to dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously
have been fulfilled in respect of the several proposed laws intituled—
Commonwealth Electoral Act (No. 2) 1973
Senate (Representation of Territories) Act 1973
Representation Act 1973
Health Insurance Commission Act 1973
Health Insurance Act 1973
Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act 1973
NOW THEREFORE, I Sir Paul Meernaa Caedwalla Hasluck, the Governor-General of
Australia, do by this my Proclamation dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(L.S.) Given under my hand and the Great Seal of Australia on 11 April 1974.
By His Excellency's Command, E.G. WHITLAM
Prime Minister
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4. On 11.11.1975, by the Hon. Sir John Robert Kerr, when both Houses of the Twenty-ninth
Parliament were dissolved prior to the general election of 13.12.1975.
PROCLAMATION
Australia By His Excellency
JOHN R. KERR the Governor-General of Australia
Governor-General
WHEREAS by section 57 of the Constitution it is provided that if the House of Representatives passes
any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the
House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the House of
Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the proposed law with or without any
amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate and the Senate rejects or
fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the
Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously:
AND WHEREAS the conditions upon which the Governor-General is empowered by that
section of the Constitution to dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously have
been fulfilled in respect of the several proposed laws intituled–
Health Insurance Levy Act 1974
Health Insurance Levy Assessment Act 1974
Income Tax (International Agreements) Act 1974
Minerals (Submerged Lands) Act 1974
Minerals (Submerged Lands) (Royalty) Act 1974
National Health Act 1974
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1974
Conciliation and Arbitration Act (No. 2) 1974
National Investment Fund Act 1974
Electoral Laws Amendment Act 1974
Electoral Act 1974
Privy Council Appeals Abolition Act 1975
Superior Court of Australia Act 1974
Electoral Re-distribution (New South Wales) 1975
Electoral Re-distribution (Queensland) 1975
Electoral Re-distribution (South Australia) 1975
Electoral Re-distribution (Tasmania) 1975
Electoral Re-distribution (Victoria) 1975
Broadcasting and Television Act (No. 2) 1974
Television Stations Licence Fees Act 1974
Broadcasting Stations Licence Fees Act 1974
NOW THEREFORE, I Sir John Robert Kerr, the Governor-General of Australia, do by this my
Proclamation dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(L.S.) Given under my hand and the Great Seal of Australia on 11 November 1975.
By His Excellency's Command,
MALCOLM FRASER
Prime Minister
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!
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5. On 4.2.1983, by the Rt Hon. Sir Ninian Martin Stephen, when both Houses of the Thirty-
second Parliament were dissolved prior to the general elections of 5.3.1983.
PROCLAMATION
Commonwealth of Australia By His Excellency the Governor-General
N. M. STEPHEN of the Commonwealth of Australia
Governor-General
WHEREAS by section 57 of the Constitution it is provided that if the House of Representatives passes
any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the
House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the House of
Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the proposed law with or without any
amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate and the Senate rejects or
fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the
Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously:
AND WHEREAS the conditions upon which the Governor-General is empowered by that
section of the Constitution to dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously have
been fulfilled in respect of the several proposed laws intituled—
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 1A) 1981
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 2A) 1981
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 3A) 1981
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 4A) 1981
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 5A) 1981
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 6A) 1981
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 7A) 1981
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 8A) 1981
Sales Tax Amendment Bill (No. 9A) 1981
Canberra College of Advanced Education Amendment Bill 1981
States Grants (Tertiary Education Assistance) Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1981
Australian National University Amendment Bill (No. 3) 1981
Social Services Amendment Bill (No. 3) 1981.
NOW THEREFORE I, SIR NINIAN MARTIN STEPHEN, the Governor-General of the
Commonwealth of Australia, do by this my Proclamation dissolve the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(L.S.) GIVEN under my hand and the Great Seal of Australia on 4 February 1983.
By His Excellency's Command,
MALCOLM FRASER
Prime Minister
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!
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6. On 5.6.1987, by the Rt Hon. Sir Ninian Martin Stephen, when both Houses of the Thirty-
fourth Parliament were dissolved prior to the general elections of 11.7.1987.
PROCLAMATION
Commonwealth of Australia By His Excellency the Governor-General
N. M. STEPHEN of the Commonwealth of Australia
Governor-General
WHEREAS by section 57 of the Constitution it is provided that if the House of Representatives passes
any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the
House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the House of
Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the proposed law with or without any
amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate and the Senate rejects or
fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the
Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously:
AND WHEREAS the conditions upon which the Governor-General is empowered by that
section of the Constitution to dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously have
been fulfilled in respect of the proposed law intituled Australia Card Bill 1986:
NOW THEREFORE I, SIR NINIAN MARTIN STEPHEN, the Governor-General of the
Commonwealth of Australia, do by this my Proclamation dissolve the Senate and the House of
Representatives at 5.00 o'clock in the afternoon on Friday, 5 June 1987.
(L.S.) GIVEN under my hand and the Great Seal of Australia on 5 June 1987:
By His Excellency's Command,
R.J.L. HAWKE
Prime Minister
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!
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Appendix 2: Tables—Election Results
5.9.1914
House of Representatives
Election ALP LIB IND Total
1913 37 38 – 75
1914 42 32 1 75
Gain/Loss +5 –6 1
Senate
Election ALP LIB Total
1913 29 7 36
1914 31 5 36
Gain/Loss +2 –2
Result Government loss
(Cook's Liberal Government loses to Fisher's ALP Opposition)
28.4.1951
House of Representatives
Election ALP LIB CP IND Total
1949 48 55 19 1 123
1951 54 52 17 – 123
Gain/Loss +6 –3 –2 –1
Senate
Election ALP LIB CP Total
1949 34 20 6 60
1951 28 26 6 60
Gain/Loss –6 +6 –
Swing 0.3% swing against the Government*
Result Government win
(Menzies' LIB–CP Coalition wins against Evatt's ALP Opposition)
*Two Party Preferred Vote (House of Representatives)
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18.5.1974
House of Representatives
Election ALP LIB CP Total
1972 67 38 20 125
1974 66 40 21 127
Gain/Loss –1 +2 +1
Senate
Election ALP LIB CP DLP Others Total
1970 26 21 5 5 3 60
1974 29 23 6 – 2 60
Gain/Loss +3 +2 1 –5 –1
Swing 1.0% swing against the Government*
Result Government win
(Whitlam's ALP Government wins against Snedden's LIB–CP Coalition
Opposition)
13.12.1975
House of Representatives
Election ALP LIB NCP CLP Total
1974 66 40 21 127
1975 36 68 22 1 127
Gain/Loss –30 +28 +1 +1
Senate
Election ALP LIB CP Others Total
1974 29 23 6 2 60
1975 27 27 8 2 64
Gain/Loss –2 +4 +2 –
Swing 7.4% swing against the Government*
Result Government loss
(Whitlam's ALP Government loses to Fraser's LIB–CP Coalition)
*Two Party Preferred Vote (House of Representatives)
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5.3.1983
House of Representatives
Election ALP LIB NPA CLP Total
1980 51 54 19 1 125
1983 75 33 17 – 125
Gain/Loss +24 –21 –2 –1
Senate
Election ALP LIB NPA AD Others Total
1980 27 28 3 5 1 64
1983 30 24 4 5 1 64
Gain/Loss +3 –4 +1 – –
Swing 3.6% swing against the Government*
Result Government loss
(Fraser's LIB–NPA Coalition Government loses to Hawke's ALP Opposition)
11.7.1987
House of Representatives
Election ALP LIB NPA CLP Total
1984 82 44 21 1 148
1987 86 43 19 – 148
Gain/Loss +4 –1 –2 –1
Senate
Election ALP LIB NPA CLP AD Others Total
1984 34 28 5 – 7 2 76
1987 32 27 6 1 7 3 76
Gain/Loss –2 –1 +1 +1 – +1
Swing 1.0% swing against the Government*
Result Government win
(Hawke's ALP Government wins against Howard's LIB–NPA Coalition
Opposition)
*Two Party Preferred Vote (House of Representatives)
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